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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :

Case No. 880680-CA

%

v.
EUGENE MYERS,

:

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a guilty plea to Forgery, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
(1978).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1989), and Rule 4(a) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether this case should be dismissed because

defendant failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial
court?
2.

Whether defendant received effective assistance of

counsel?
CONSTITUTIONAL, PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented
for review is contained in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with six counts of
forgery, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-6-501 (1978).

Defendant pled guilty to one count of

forgery on September 12, 1988, the State dismissed all of the
other charges in exchange for the plea.

Judge Frank G. Noel

sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in
prison to run consecutively to any other terms defendant was
serving at the time.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 20, 1987, Barbara Harris was arrested at
the Harmon's grocery store after attempting to cash a forged
check.

While Harris was being detained, the security guard at

Harmons asked if anybody was with her.

She stated "that there

was a gold car out in the parking lot with the other people that
were with her."

(S.T. 6).

She said one of them was her sister-

in-law (S.T. 15, 26). When Deputy Churchich arrived, Nick
Roberts, an off-duty deputy working as a security guard, advised
him of the forgery situation inside the store and that the
accomplices were probably in the gold Cadillac in the parking lot
(S.T. 7-8). Roberts joined Churchich in the patrol car (T. 8).
After observing the gold Cadillac, the only gold car
in the parking lot, they pulled up behind the vehicle (S.T. 7-8).
There were two parties in the car:

a female was in the front

The transcript of August 16, 1988, motion to suppress hearing
will hereinafter be referred to as "S.T." The transcript of the
plea proceedings of September 12, 1988 will be referred to as
"T.P."
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passenger seat and a male was sitting in the back seat, right
side.

Before contacting the suspects, Deputy Roberts contacted

the Salt Lake City Police Department, Detective Division.

The

Salt lake City Police Department informed him that there were
several parties involved in cashing these checks.

They also

instructed the deputy to stop the vehicle because the parties in
the car were accessories to the check writing situation (S.T.
26).
The woman in the gold Cadillac looked back through the
back window at the patrol car and then she slid to the driver's
seat and started the car.

It looked like she was going to pull

away, so Deputy Churchich activated the lights on his patrol car
(S.T. 8-9). The woman then stopped the car (S.T. 9).
Defendant was the male occupant.

As Deputy Roberts

approached the passenger side he observed defendant putting his
left hand inside his coat as if he were going to retrieve a gun.
With his left hand, defendant then moved a tan colored envelope
from under his leg on the seat, to the floorboards and then
stepped on it.

Also, he pushed something black under the seat

with his foot (S.T. 10-11).

Roberts asked defendant to step out

of the car and patted him down for weapons (S.T. 11). Roberts
asked for permission to search the vehicle and defendant
consented (S.T. 11). Roberts immediately retrieved the envelope.
Inside the envelope, which was open, were several more checks
just like the one cashed inside Harmon's and phony identification
(S.T. 12). The other object under the seat was a small, black,
toy pistol that resembed a Colt Automatic 38 (S.T. 12-13).

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress.
The court stated that "There was probable cause to make a stop"
coupled with the information given to the deputy by the Salt Lake
City Police Department

(S.T. 36).

On September 12, 1988, the defendant was scheduled to
proceed to trial; however, he elected to change his plea to
guilty.

At the request of Salt Lake County Attorney David Yocom,

one of his former law partners, James Barber, appeared in court
as counsel for the defendant (T.P. 2-3). Defendant pled guilty
to count III of the Third Amended Information which alleged
Forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-501.
182-84).

The court relied upon a guilty plea affidavit (R.

In addition, the court asked defendant if he had read

the affidavit and asked him whether he felt he understood it.
Defendant responded, "I fully understand it." (T.P. 8)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea
and this Court should dismiss this appeal.

Even if this Court

chooses to address the merits of the appeal it may affirm
defendant's plea.

Defendant's plea was voluntarily entered in

compliance with Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

The trial court apprised defendant that by entering a

guilty plea, defendant would relinquish certain constitutional
rights and the state would be precluded from proving the elements
of his crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
signed specified what those rights were.
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The affidavit defendant

Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel.

Neither deficient performance, nor prejudice* is

established by the record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT MAY NOT RAISE CLAIMS ATTACKING HIS
GUILTY PLEA FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL,
BUT, EVEN IF THIS COURT CONSIDERS HIS CLAIMS,
HIS PLEA WAS VALID.
Initially, we roust address the fact that the record
does not indicate that defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.

According to State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah

1987), this Court should not entertain an attack on a guilty plea
first raised on appeal in the absence of exceptional
circumstances or plain error.

Ici. at 1311.

On the other hand,

defendant's motion to arrest judgment might be construed as a
motion to withdraw the guilty plea (R. 149). However, he did not
raise the same issues in that motion that he now raises in this
Court.

This appeal should, therefore, be dismissed because

defendant failed to move for relief in the trial court.
In the event that this Court chooses to address the
merits of defendant's claims, the State maintains that
defendant's guilty plea was validly entered.

After defendant

entered his guilty plea, Judge Noel alerted defendant that he was
relinquishing his constitutional rights (T.P. 5) and that the
state would not be required to prove the elements of his crime
beyond a reasonable doubt (T.P. 7). Admittedly, the judge did
not articulate specifically the nature of the constitutional
rights defendant was waiving.

The "Statement of Defendant"
-s-

signed by defendant did specify those rights (R. 182-84).
Defendant unequivocally stated that he fully understood what this
plea would entail and that he was entering the plea voluntarily
(T.P. 8).
Defendant argues that at the time that he pled guilty
to forgery, the trial court erred by failing to comply with the
requirements of Rule 11(e)(3).

Rule 11(e)(3) provides:

The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest and shall not accept
such a plea until the court has made the
findings:
That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a
jury trial and to confront and cross-examine
in open court the witnesses against him, and
that by entering the plea he waives all of
those rights;
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) (Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e)(3) (Supp.
1989, repealed effective July 1, 1990)).
Defendant points out that the trial court did not
specifically inquire whether he understood that by pleading
guilty he waived his rights against self-incrimination, to
confrontation, and to a jury trial.

Defendant maintains that

strict, and not just substantial, compliance with the rule is
required and failure to comply with the requirements of Rule
11(e)(3) necessitates setting aside the guilty plea.

Defendant

relies on State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Utah 1987),
where the court stated that an affidavit may be used to promote
efficiency, but it is only the starting point for the judge.

A

judge should still question the defendant concerning his
understanding of the affidavit and review it with the defendant
to fulfill the Rule 11 requirement,

Ixi. at 1313.

Similarly, defendant relies on State v, Vasilacopulos,
756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988) and State v. Valencia, 7T6 P.2d 1332
(Utah App. 1989).

Although these cases stand for the proposition

that strict and not just substantial compliance is required under
Rule 11(e)(3) and Gibbons, they are inconsistent with recent Utah
Supreme Court rulings and should not be followed.

Defendant's

argument that the record as a whole test applies only in pre
Gibbons cases lacks merit.
Recently, in Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17
(Utah Aug. 22, 1989), the Utah Supreme Court found that although
the trial judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11 when Jolivet
entered his plea,
"[T]he absence of a finding under [section
77-35-11] is not critical so long as the
record as a whole affirmatively establishes
that the defendant entered his plea with full
knowledge and understanding of its
consequences and of the rights he was
waiving." State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405
(Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310,
311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d
309,310 (Utah 1985).
115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18.
Decided prior to Jolivet, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d
1266 (Utah 1988), also applies the record as a whole test.
Copeland court said:
The United States Supreme Court has said,
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for
demonstrating in the record at the time the
plea is entered the defendant's understanding
of the nature of the charge against him."
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. [459,]
470 . . . . (emphasis in the original). We
think the most effective way to do this is to
have a defendant state in his own words his
understanding of the offense and the actions
which make him guilty of the offense. By

The

this statement, the trial court can assure
itself that the defendant is truly submitting
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover/ the
record on appeal will clearly reflect the
defendant's understanding. Although this
method is therefore preferable to others, it
is not absolutely required. The test is
voluntariness.
765 P.2d at 1273.
Scrutinizing Gibbons reveals that the court was
recommending the best method of determining the voluntariness of
a plea, not imposing a "strict compliance" test.

Copeland

clearly states that strict Rule 11 compliance is not absolutely
required when a guilty plea is otherwise voluntary.

Thus,

substantial compliance is sufficient where the record establishes
that the defendant pled voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.

See also State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02

(Utah 1986) (technical Rule 11 violations do not automatically
invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea).
In State v. Thurston, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 32-33
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court applied the record as a whole
test to a post-Gibbons guilty plea citing to, inter alia,
Copeland, Jolivet and Kay.

Thurston did not acknowledge either

Vasilacopulos of Valencia, nor cite to Gibbons.

Apparently, this

Court has abandoned the strict compliance rule articulated in
Vasilacopulos and Valencia.

As stated above, the test is whether

the record as a whole establishes that the plea was entered "with
full knowledge and understanding of its consequences, and the
rights [defendant] is waiving."
33.

Thurston, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. at

In the instant matter, the trial judge relied upon an
affidavit which defendant signed and acknowledged that* he had
read (R. 182-184).

Before accepting the defendant's guilty plea,

the trial judge asked him several questions.

Judge Noel asked

whether defendant had reviewed the statement with his attorney,
and whether he read and understood the document.

Defendant

responded by expressly saying "I fully understand it" (T.P. 4).
The judge also specifically asked defendant if he had any
questions about it (T.P. 4). The judge did not stop there.

He

also told defendant that the document contained certain
constitutional rights, and that entering a plea waives those
constitutional rights (T.P. 5).
Also, Judge Noel conscientiously alerted the defendant
that in order to be convicted of forgery, the state would be
required to prove each and every one of the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Judge Noel further asked defendant if he

understood that if he entered a guilty plea, the state would not
be required to make that proof.

Defendant positively and

unequivocally responded, "Right" (T.P. 7).
Defendant knew that he had a right to a jury trial.
Defendant was representing himself at the time the trial court
made the minute entry of September 9, 1988 (R. 235) which
scheduled a jury trial for September 12, 1988.

Defendant also

had personally cross-examined the witnesses who appeared at the
suppresion hearing.

Defendant is not unfamiliar with the legal

system, as is evidenced by the many pleadings he filed on his own
behalf in this case.

The record as a whole establishes that he

-9-

knew he had the right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses and
to avoid self-incrimination.

His guilty plea was valid.
POINT II

DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Next, defendant claims that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel.

He relies on Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 688 (1984), which established the standard for
determining the existence of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Utah Supreme Court has followed this standard.
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989).

State v.

In order to prevail on

such a claim, a defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner which
performance fell below an objective standard, and second that
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.

Id.

Defendant

must overcome a strong presumption that counsel was adequate.
State v. Bullock,

P.2d

,

, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36

(1989).
First, defendant must show specific acts or omissions
which fall outside the range of professionally competent
assistance.

State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989).

Indeed, the record does not indicate that Mr. Barber reviewed
defendant's police report or reviewed a transcript of the
suppression hearing.
these items.

Nor does it indicate that he did not review

The record is silent on this issue.

This does not

establish that Barber failed the first prong of the test.
Defendant claims that Barber was ineffective because he
did not advise defendant to go to trial or to enter a conditional

-i n _

plea to preserve the suppression issue.

Defendant asserts that

he now recognizes that the suppression ruling would have been
appealable and that he may have prevailed on appeal.

Thus, he

argues that Barber's performance was deficient and prejudicial to
him.

The record does not disclose whether Barber advised

defendant concerning the possibility of appealing the suppression
ruling one way or the other.

The record does not establish that

Barber was deficient in this respect.

Assuming for argument's

sake that Barber failed to give any advice in this area, this
Court should still find that counsel was adequate.
To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.

Carter, 776 P.2d at 893.

Review of the

suppression hearing transcript reveals that Judge Noel's denial
of the motion to suppress would not have been overturned on
appeal even if defendant had preserved the right to appeal it#

2

The statement of Barbara Harris that accomplices to the
forgery were in a gold car coupled with the request from the Salt
Lake City Police Department to stop the suspect vehicle
established reasonable suspicion for the initial stop of the car.
2
It is important to note that defendant may not directly
challenge the suppression ruling because his unconditional plea
waives all nonjurisdictional issues not relating to the validity
of the plea itself. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah
1989). Thus, he may only prevail if he establishes that counsel
was ineffective by allowing him to plead unconditionally when he
had an issue that would have resulted in suppression of the
evidence on appeal. See State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 219
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). (Defendant must establish a reasonable
likelihood of a different result absent counsel's deficient
performance)
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State v, Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) ("an officer
may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion'
that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime");
State v, Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Additionally, the officers observed the woman in the car with
defendant attempt to drive away when she saw the officers.

While

this action, alone, would not establish a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, in this factual context the suspect's furtive
movements could be construed as incriminating.

See State v.

Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968) " [Deliberately furtive
actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers
are strong indicia of men rea, and when coupled with specific
knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the
evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in
the decision to make an arrest.")
Defendant asserts that there was no reasonable
suspicion to detain him because his version of the evidence is
that the officer did not have specific knowledge relating him to
a crime.

This assertion is misguided.

The trial court chose to

believe that the officer was told that the people in the gold car
in the parking lot were involved in the crime.

Had the

suppression issue been preserved for appeal, this Court would
have deferred to the trial court's findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

1987); Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327. Based upon the facts supporting
the trial court's legal conclusion that there was probable cause
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to arrest defendant, this Court would most likely have found on
appeal of the suppression issue that the trial court's legal
conclusion, which applied an even stricter standard than
required, was not erroneous.

See Oates v, Chavez, 749 P.2d 658,

659 (Utah 1988) (appellate court applies a correction of error
standard on review of trial court's legal conclusions); and
Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327.

For this reason, defendant would not

likely have obtained a different result on the suppression issue
and counsel's failure to preserve the issue for appeal was not
prejudicial.
Finally, defendant ignores that the evidence also
revealed that he consented to the search of the Cadillac.
Regardless of the validity of the stop, absent evidence that
defendant was coerced to grant his consent as a consequence of
the illegal stop, defendant's consent renders the evidence
admissible.

State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155-56 (Utah Ct. App.

1989), cert, granted,

P.2d

(Utah 1989), United States v.

Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1989).

This Court could

uphold the lower court's admission of the evidence on this basis.
State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (appellate court
may affirm decision of lower court to admit evidence on any
proper ground).

Defendant has not established, therefore, that

there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result had he
either gone to trial or entered a conditional plea.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests- this Court
to dismiss the appeal for failure to move to withdraw the plea or
to affirm defendant's conviction on the merits.
^

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of April, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

/'»•?,( u//~Sj'</'
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
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